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Resumo
O contexto das políticas ambientais brasileiras 
mudou de várias maneiras ao longo das 
últimas duas décadas, com alguns aspectos 
positivos para o meio ambiente e outros não. 
Mudanças positivas incluem a criação de um 
Ministério do Meio Ambiente e de um sistema 
de licenciamento ambiental, o aumento da 
organização da sociedade civil, a criação de 
reservas e demarcação de áreas indígena e o 
advento das convenções internacionais sobre o 
clima e a biodiversidade. No entanto, os projetos 
de desenvolvimento na Amazônia brasileira 
têm contornado as restrições ambientais de 
várias maneiras, e as modifi cações do passado e 
do presente no sistema estão enfraquecendo a 
proteção ambiental. A hostilidade atual do clima 
político no Brasil em questões ambientais faz 
com que os esforços para fortalecer as políticas 
ambientais sejam ainda mais dependentes 
de uma cuidadosa seleção de estratégias. Em 
Face da instabilidade, a melhor estratégia é 
estar preparado para as oportunidades de 
conservação, incluíndo o uso da ciência e 
tecnologia em áreas relevantes. Compreender 
a natureza complexa da burocracia brasileira é 
essencial neste processo. O valor dos serviços 
ambientais prestados pela manutenção da 
fl oresta amazônica poderia ser um elemento-
chave para determinar o futuro da política 
ambiental e da fl oresta.
Abstract
The context of  Brazil’s environmental policies 
has changed in multiple ways over the past two 
decades, some positive for the environment and 
others not. Positive changes include creation of  
a Ministry of  the Environment and a system of  
environmental licensing, increased organization 
of  civil society, creation of  reserves and 
demarcation of  indigenous areas, and the advent 
of  international conventions on climate and 
biodiversity. However, development projects 
in Brazilian Amazonia have circumvented 
environmental restrictions in various ways, and 
past and present modifi cations to the system 
are weakening environmental protection. The 
current hostility of  the political climate in 
Brazil in environmental matters makes efforts 
to strengthen environmental policies even more 
dependent on careful selection of  strategies. 
Making the best of  instability by being 
prepared for conservation opportunities is one 
method, as is the use of  science and technology 
in relevant areas. Understanding the complex 
nature of  Brazilian bureaucracy is essential 
in this process. The value of  environmental 
services provided by maintaining Amazon 
forest could be a key element in determining 
the future of  environmental policy and of  the 
forest.
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INTRODUCTION
Brazil’s Amazon region has a special importance in discussions of  
environmental policy because of  the region’s cultural diversity, its biodiversity, 
and its role in global climate. The areas involved are often compared to Europe 
because the area originally covered by Amazon forest in Brazil is approximately 
that of  Western Europe. In 1998 the deforested area surpassed the area of  
France, and by 2011 (Figure 1), with 756,663 km2 deforested (BRAZIL, INPE, 
2012), clearing had expanded to engulf  additional areas equivalent to Switzerland, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal. Environmental policy changes in 
Amazonia affect much greater areas of  tropical forest and their associated 
environmental services than would be the case in other countries. Because 
modern “development” is only now entering large areas of  natural ecosystems 
in Amazonia, there is much greater scope for signifi cant changes in development 
patterns as compared to countries where many options have already been closed. 
The present paper examines the evolving context of  environmental policy in 
Brazilian Amazonia with a view to identifying opportunities and dangers in terms 
of  the future course of  development in the region.
Figure 1. Brazil’s Legal Amazon region showing deforestation through 2011 and 
locations mentioned in the text.
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1  THE CHANGING CONTEXT
1.1  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ADVANCES
The last decades have brought signifi cant improvements for environmental 
policies, but, at the same time, much has either not changed or has changed less 
than might appear. Changes include:
1) Creation of  the Ministry of  the Environment (MMA) and state-level 
environmental agencies (OEMAs). 
2) Consolidation of  the licensing system for infrastructure projects. The 
Environmental Impact Study and report (EIA-RIMA) has been required for 
major projects since 1986. In the early years, projects that were political priories 
sometimes proceeded without any environmental report, in clear violation of  the 
legal requirements. Examples include the North-South Railway and the Carajás 
pig-iron smelters (FEARNSIDE, 1989). Attempts to escape reporting are less 
frequent today, but still exist. Some are successful (such as Tucuruí-II) and 
some not (such as the central portion of  the BR-319 Highway). The licensing 
system is a signifi cant factor in forcing more attention to the environment, but 
the features of  the system that limit its effectiveness have not changed since its 
inception: the infl uence of  project proponents on the content of  the reports due 
to their roles in paying for and supervising the studies, and the report’s timing 
in the process after the political decision to build the infrastructure in question 
has, in fact, already been made and after contractors and others who stand to 
benefi t fi nancially from the project have been mobilized (see FEARNSIDE; 
BARBOSA, 1996). 
3) Formation of  hundreds of  non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
both at the grassroots level and for conducting research and lobbying. These 
have greatly increased the level of  input from civil society in formulating 
environmental policy.
4) Demarcation of  over 40 million hectares of  indigenous areas. Although 
this was a requirement written into Brazil’s 1988 constitution, for over a decade 
there was little indication that this was going to occur in practice. The demarcation 
signifi cantly increases the security of  indigenous peoples and reinforces their role 
in environmental protection and in policy debates.
5) International conventions represent a new and potentially important 
infl uence. The most relevant conventions are the United Nations Framework 
Philip M. Fearnside 12
Novos Cadernos NAEA • v. 16 n. 2 • p. 9-25 • dez. 2013
Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), both signed in 1992 at the ECO-92 “earth summit” in Rio 
de Janeiro. Especially the UN-FCCC, or “climate convention,” may infl uence 
events through the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which was drafted under the 
Convention in 1997 with its fi rst commitment period expiring at the end of  2012. 
The second commitment period or a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, beginning 
in 2013, is expected to include avoided deforestation as a mitigation measure, 
and, depending on decisions such as those regarding carbon accounting, could 
potentially have a substantial infl uence in Brazilian Amazonia (FEARNSIDE, 
2012a,b; 2013a).
1.2  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SETBACKS
The above list of  environmental policy developments with the potential 
to contribute to containing deforestation and maintaining environmental quality 
needs to be viewed in the context of  much more powerful changes on the other 
side – speeding deforestation. The net effect is hardly encouraging, given that the 
area deforested over the 1990-2011 period totaled 317,918 km2, an area larger 
than Spain and Portugal together (as compared to the original area of  Brazil’s 
Amazon forest, which is roughly the same as that of  Western Europe). The 
plans and projects for roads and other infrastructure set in motion processes 
that will drive deforestation for decades in the future. The roads include major 
highways such as the BR-319 (Manaus-Porto Velho), which would open central 
and northern Amazonia to the actors and processes of  the Arc of  Deforestation 
(FEARNSIDE; GRAÇA, 2009).
A key part of  the impact of  the BR-319 is the plan for a series of  side 
roads leading from the main highway to each of  the municipal seats along the 
Madeira and Purus Rivers. One of  the roads would cross the Purus River at 
Tapuã and continue to Coarí, Tefé and Juruá. This would open the large block 
of  forest in the western part of  the state of  Amazonas. The EIA for the BR-319 
claims that these roads are not planned by the federal government (UFAM, 2009: 
Vol. 1, p. 58). However, the National Department of  Transport Infrastructure 
(DNIT) website continues to display a map of  planned roads indicating these 
routes (BRAZIL, DNIT, 2002). In October 2009 the Minister of  Transportation 
began claiming that no side roads would be built. Unfortunately, there is little 
reason to believe that such a promise would be kept. No institutional mechanism 
exists for taking on a commitment not to build specifi c infrastructure projects. 
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There is a clear parallel with what NGOs refer to as the “institutional lie” with 
respect to the Xingu River dams planned upstream from the Belo Monte Dam 
(FEARNSIDE, 2012c). The credibility of  the electrical sector in this regard is 
very low given the history of  past cases in parallel situations where promises 
of  this type are made and later broken (see FEARNSIDE, 2006). There is little 
reason to believe that events in the highway sector are different.
Brazil’s activity in building infrastructure in other Amazonian countries 
has increased rapidly in recent years. Major projects built with Brazilian money 
(from BNDES) and Brazilian construction fi rms include the road known as 
the “Highway to the Pacifi c” in Brazil or the “Transoceanic Highway” in Peru. 
Brazil is preparing to build six dams in Peru to produce electricity for sale to 
Brazil: Inambari (2000 MW), Sumabeni (1074 MW), Paquitzapango (2000 
MW), Uru-bamba (940 MW), Vizcatan (750 MW) and Chuquipampa (800 MW) 
(DOUROJEANNI, 2009; VEJA, 2010). At least ten other such dams are in the 
pipeline, although the total number is indeterminate. There are two such dams 
to be built in Bolivia, one in Ecuador and one in Guyana. Various other projects 
are underway, such as the Rurrenabaque road in Bolivia, the Georgetown road in 
Guiana, and pipeline projects in Peru and Ecuador. Petrobrás exploits oil and gas 
in Peru (with a controversial major expansion planned in the Camesea area in the 
biodiversity hotspot in the Madre de Dios basin), as well as similar operations in 
Bolivia and Ecuador (e.g., LEROY; MALERBA, 2005; FINER et al., 2008). Brazil 
is now fi nding itself  in the same situation as that for which the United States 
was criticized for years: building environmentally destructive projects abroad 
that would not meet environmental standards at home. These countries have 
less requirements for licensing and measures to avoid environmental and social 
impacts than does Brazil.
2  WHO’S IN CHARGE OF PUBLIC POLICY? 
Public policies in Amazonia are obviously contradictory in many cases. 
The government attempts to control deforestation with fi nes at the same time 
that it promotes deforestation though settlement projects, agricultural fi nancing, 
roadbuilding and land-tenure criteria. Much of  this is explained by the fact that 
the government is not a monolithic block, but instead is composed of  many 
agencies with different purposes. The federal government alone is composed 
of  38 ministries or ministerial-level agencies, which is probably a world record. 
These ministries struggle with each other for budget allocations and presidential 
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favor. The struggle for funding is continuous, rather than being confi ned to the 
budget-formulation process, because Brazil has a system of  “contingenciamento” 
(placing in contingency status) that would appear very strange to anyone not 
familiar with the country. The budget is approved before the beginning of  
the fi scal year, but the funds allotted to each ministry are given out in small 
installments. Usually, towards the middle of  the year, the government discovers 
that it does not have enough money to honor the promises made in the annual 
budget. It therefore places some of  the budget items in contingency status, 
meaning that they get no money until such time as suffi cient tax revenues have 
been collected to pay for them. When money does materialize later, which is not 
always the case, it is often released in the fi nal days of  the fi scal year, in which 
case the bureaucratic procedures needed to spend the money are such that much 
of  it must be returned to the national treasury unspent. This system means that 
the ministries must fi ght among themselves over which programs will be put in 
contingency status and which will go forward as planned. The Ministry of  the 
Environment is by no means the most powerful, and therefore not only has a 
smaller budget but is more likely to see its funds put in contingency status.
Given the plethora of  confl icting signals, one might well wonder who 
is in charge of  public policies for Amazonia. The Superintendency for the 
Development of  Amazonia (SUDAM) promoted large cattle ranches from its 
creation in 1966 until a 1991 policy change discontinued fi scal incentives for 
ranching (but multiple exceptions continued: see FEARNSIDE, 1990). Financing 
of  environmentally destructive developments such as sawmills and pig-iron 
plants continued after the change. SUDAM was abolished in 2002 as the result of  
a corruption scandal, but was recreated as the Agency for the Development of  
Amazonia (ADA) in 2003. The National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform (INCRA) has been a major actor in establishing settlements for small 
farmers. While in the 1970s INCRA was responsible for bringing colonists to 
settlement areas such as those on the Transamazon Highway, it has since been 
almost exclusively reactive, confi ning its role to “regularizing” land claims by 
illegal squatters.
In June 2007 a new ministerial-level position for “strategic affairs” 
was created especially for Mangabeira Unger. The new minister was charged 
with thinking about long-range issues, especially with regard to Amazonian 
development. By a presidential decision, the “Sustainable Amazonia Plan” 
(Plano Amazônia Sustentável, or PAS) was taken away from the Ministry of  the 
Environment and transferred to the new ministry. A series of  suggestions were 
fl oated, ostensibly only as a discussion exercise. Most notable was a proposal 
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to divert water from the Amazon Basin to semi-arid Northeastern Brazil. The 
practical barriers to such a scheme caused it to wither, but this was not the case 
for another pet project with far-reaching consequences: the legalization of  illegal 
land claims in Amazonia.
In 2009, Provisional Measure (MP) 158, widely known as the “MP da 
grilagem” (“landgrabbers’ provisional measure”), was approved by the National 
Congress as Law No. 11,952. The measure allows legalization of  claims up to 
1500 ha in area. The objective is to legalize 67 million hectares, an area half  the 
size of  the state of  Pará. This is the area controlled by INCRA in Amazonia that 
is still “without destination” (BRAZIL, INCRA, 2009, p. 17). Most important, 
the measure creates the expectation among invaders of  all sizes that future 
“legalizations” will also take place, and that those who invade public land today 
have a good chance of  obtaining a legal title in the future. This is a step back in 
the much-needed transition to eliminate land invasion as a means of  obtaining 
land tenure in Amazonia (FEARNSIDE, 2001). Shortly after his land-tenure 
legalization scheme was passed by the congress, Mangabeira Unger quit his post. 
The strategic affairs ministry continues to exist, but with less infl uence.
Various ministries and other sectors of  the government have open confl icts 
over environmental policies. The ministers of  environment and agriculture 
clash regularly over the issue of  the Forestry Code and over whether sugar cane 
should be allowed to be planted in Amazonia (mostly for biofuel). Recently the 
executive branch has sought to limit the authority of  the Public Ministry (under 
the Ministry of  Justice) in environmental matters. The executive branch has also 
recently moved to restrict the actions of  the Union Court of  Accounts (TCU) in 
investigating expenditures for major infrastructure projects such as Amazonian 
highways. The political climate in the legislative branch is also subject to dramatic 
swings, as illustrated by the contrast between the strong environmental clauses 
approved in the present Brazilian constitution in 1988 and the current dominance 
of  the “ruralist block” (representatives of  large landholders) in dismantling 
Brazil’s Forest Code. 
The sociology of  the Brazilian bureaucracy was studied by Steven Bunker 
(1979), who compare it to the resolution of  land confl icts between poor squatters 
and large landholders in the almost-feudal society in the interior of  Northeastern 
Brazil. Government agencies traditionally stand aside while these groups fi ght on 
the ground, and only after one side has won does the government step in to grant 
land title to the victor. 
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Calls have often been made for speaking with one voice, especially with 
respect to environmental policies. Brazil’s presidents have frequently shown 
their displeasure when ministers publically express different viewpoints. 
However, the tendency to stifl e disagreement is dangerous. Differences between 
agencies in the environmental area and those building infrastructure are natural. 
If  differences are to be settled in secret and only a unifi ed position is made 
public, the environment would lose in almost every case, as the Ministry of  the 
Environment is obviously not the most powerful ministry. The danger is best 
illustrated by the history of  nuclear power in the United States. There the Atomic 
Energy Commission was created shortly after World War II to both promote 
and to regulate nuclear energy. Literally thousands of  near accidents happened 
outside of  the public view until the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. After 
that incident, the functions were divided into two agencies, a separate Nuclear 
Regulatory Agency being responsible for safety regulation. Since then differences 
have been public and the record has been very much better.
3  STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
3.1  MAKING THE BEST OF INSTABILITY
Individual policy makers, politicians and political administrators are very 
temporary. Each change creates both risks and opportunities. For example, 
the change in the state governorship in 1999 in Acre brought a clear shift to 
more environmental concern under the administration of  Jorge Viana, as did 
the change of  government to Eduardo Braga in Amazonas in 2002. However, 
swings can also go in the other direction.
This form of  temporary opportunity means that it is important to be able 
to quickly take advantage of  favorable political environments when they occur: to 
“run with ball when you have it.” Biologists will recognize this as an “r-selected” 
strategy (MacARTHUR; WILSON, 1967). An r-selected strategy is also indicated 
in situations of  chaos or lack of  authority—a situation that sometimes prevails 
in parts of  Amazonia. Rapid evolution, both biological and in terms of  social 
innovations, occurs in these situations (GUNDERSEN; HOLLING, 2002). 
Often opportunities for environmental and social advances in Amazonia 
have been associated with tragic events. Examples include the Chico Mendes 
assassination in 1988 leading to creation of  extractive reserves, the El Dourado dos 
Carajás massacre in 1996 leading to a restarting land reform, and the assassination 
of  Dorothy Stang in 2005 leading to creation of  a mosaic of  reserves in the Terra 
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do Meio. These measures represent an opportunistic implementation of  plans 
that had been drawn up in the years before these triggering events took place, 
but the plans had been stalled and not transformed into active projects. Being 
prepared to take advantage of  opportunities is therefore a key part of  following 
an r-selected strategy.
It should be remembered that the same sort of  situation applies on the 
other side. Examples include the moves to quickly force approval of  hydroelectric 
dams following the electricity shortage (apagão) of  2001, and the pressure to 
speed approval of  the Belo Monte Dam following the windfall provided by an 
incident in which the chief  ELETROBRÁS engineer for Belo Monte was cut 
with a machete during an indigenous demonstration against the dam in Altamira 
in May 2008.
3.2  SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Science and technology are essential sources of  information for formulating 
environmental policy. Brazil has made notable progress in deforestation 
monitoring (BRAZIL, INPE, 2012). However, several clear discrepancies have 
never been resolved (FEARNSIDE, 1993; FEARNSIDE; BARBOSA, 2004). It 
is also important that there be independent groups working in the same area of  
deforestation monitoring. The work of  the Institute for Man and Environment 
in Amazonia (IMAZON) has been fi lling this role (see: http://www.imazon.org.
br/novo2008/index.php?). Recent advances in remote sensing interpretation are 
expected to allow civil society to play a much greater role in the near future in 
assuring that ground truth matches the fi ndings obtained by satellite, an initiative 
that involves both NGOs and Google (TOLLEFSON, 2009).
Research progress has traditionally been dominated by institutions such 
as the National Institute for Research in Amazonia (INPA) and the Emilio 
Goeldi Museum (MPEG), and by major research projects such as the Large-
Scale Atmosphere-Biosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA) and the Biological 
Dynamics of  Forest Fragments Project (PDBFF). NGOs such as IMAZON and 
the Institute for Research and Environment in Amazonia (IPAM) provide a new 
and healthy source of  competition with traditional government institutions in 
this area.
Government priorities in science and technology emphasize fi elds such 
as biomedical research, genomics and nanotechnology. However, for providing 
information relevant to Amazonian environmental policy, much of  what is 
needed from science is much more low-technology in nature, being based on 
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observations in the fi eld and on understanding local cultures and traditional 
knowledge (FEARNSIDE, 2010). Even for more-traditional data collection in 
science, much of  what is needed in Amazonia remains to be done using simple 
tools such as spring balances and tape measures.
Not yet incorporated into policy is the value of  the environmental services 
of  the forest (such as water cycling) and the nearness of  the threat posed by 
climate change killing the forest itself. Unfortunately, science and technology 
are often totally ignored in Amazonian policy making when the results are 
inconvenient (FEARNSIDE, 1986).
4  ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AS A BASIS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Over the course of  two decades the idea of  “environmental services” 
has risen from a novelty to a household word (FEARNSIDE, 2008a). There 
have been many gains in the science and in the policy areas related to payment 
for environmental services, but the consideration of  environmental services 
still does not affect decisions such as building of  destructive infrastructure. 
Environmental concerns need to be a central part of  the decision on building the 
projects at all, and not just an addition of  complementary measures to minimize 
impacts. A clear example is the inconsistency between the proposed re-opening 
of  the BR-319 Highway and the National Policy for Climate Change (PNMC) 
announced in 2008 (BRAZIL, CIMC, 2008). The highway would put in place a 
force for deforestation that will speed clearing and greenhouse-gas emissions for 
decades, making it much more diffi cult to reduce deforestation as expected under 
the PNMC.
The place of  environmental services in Amazonian development 
depends heavily on the scale involved. This scale depends on the place of  forest 
maintenance in mitigation under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UN-FCCC). The Brazilian foreign ministry’s current opposition 
to carbon credit that is “fungible,” or exchangeable against emissions from fossil 
fuels, greatly limits the scale of  potential monetary fl ows from this source to 
Amazonia. Funds for voluntary payments for environmental services will be 
much more limited if  industrialized countries take on major commitments under 
the formal agreement. 
The interests of  different countries in the climate negotiation inherently 
diverge. One need only put oneself  in the shoes of  a politician in Europe. For 
example, if  a group of  environmentalists were to go to a French politician and 
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demand that France spend, say, 5% of  its gross domestic product on fi ghting 
global warming, the reply might be that this would be fi ne if  spent on building 
factories for wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, retooling French auto plants to 
produce ecological cars, etc. All of  this would produce income and jobs in France. 
If  the solution were to take this money and send it to Brazil to stop deforestation 
it would do nothing for the economy of  France. Even if  the climatic benefi t 
were triple or more for spending money on containing Brazilian deforestation, 
European countries (and European-based NGOs) would oppose it. Because 
mitigation exclusively “at home” is much more expensive, this means that these 
countries would not agree to the deep cuts in emissions that would be needed 
to avoid impacts such as savannization Amazonian forest. Brazil has to fi ght for 
its interests, which are inherently different from those of  European countries 
(FEARNSIDE, 2012a). Brazil’s interests are also different from those of  China 
and India, which have explosively expanding fossil-fuel-based economies. 
This author has argued that Brazil must be the leader in promoting 
tropical forest maintenance for mitigation and in pressing for deep cuts in 
emissions worldwide (e.g., FEARNSIDE, 2009). So far, the Brazilian Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs (MRE) has adopted a strategy of  trying to be the “last one on the 
streetcar,” as it would be said in Brazil. For example, only in 2009 did Brazil lend 
its support to a 2ºC limit on temperature increase over pre-industrial levels, after 
over 100 countries had already endorsed this limit.
Brazil has yet to take a position on the defi nition of  “dangerous” 
climate change in terms of  a concentration of  greenhouse gases. This limit will 
be negotiated as required by Article 2 of  the UN-FCCC, which requires that 
greenhouse gas concentrations not provoke “dangerous interference with the 
climate system.” A concentration of  400 ppmv CO2-equivalent implies only 
an 80% chance of  staying within a 2ºC maximum increase over pre-industrial 
temperatures, while 350 ppmv would be the limit for 90% certainty (HARE; 
MEINSHAUSEN, 2006). There may even be a need to hold warming to less 
than 2ºC to avoid the threat to Amazon forest from drought and fi re. Current 
emissions trends can be expected to push these factors beyond critical “tipping 
points” well before the end of  the current century (COX et al., 2004, 2008; 
MALHI et al., 2008; NEPSTAD et al., 2008; NOBRE; BORMA, 2009). The next 
few years are critical in efforts to contain global warming below 2ºC, especially 
the emissions level by 2020 (ROGEL et al., 2013). 
Much less threat to the Amazon forest is indicated by a new version of  
the Hadley Center model in 2013, which incorporates the effect of  increased 
CO2 in increasing tree growth and reducing water loss (COX et al., 2013; 
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GOOD et al., 2013; HUNTINGFORD et al., 2013). This good news is tempered 
by the possible effects of  the models not having included negative consequences 
of  higher CO2, such as greater stimulation of  growth of  lianas as compared to trees 
(FEARNSIDE, 2013b). The models also still omit the critical issue of  increased 
frequency of  forest fi res in response to a dryer and hotter climate. The Hadley 
Center authors warn that the new result “does not invalidate the HadCM3LC 
dieback projection. Indeed, the latter remains a possible scenario of  dangerous 
climate change, which requires further understanding” (GOOD et al., 2013).
The fact that Brazil’s fi rst national inventory of  greenhouse gas emissions 
(BRAZIL, MCT, 2004) systematically underestimated emissions undercut efforts 
to bring global warming under control (FEARNSIDE, 2008b). The second 
inventory (BRAZIL, MCT, 2010) avoids some of  the major underestimates of  
the fi rst inventory for the portion of  the emission coming from deforestation. 
However, some of  Brazil’s key emissions, such as methane from hydroelectric 
dams and carbon dioxide from logging in the Amazon forest, are simply omitted. 
If  emissions are underestimated, then the total amount of  emission that needs 
to be reduced in the world will be underestimated, and the commitments made 
in international negotiations will be insuffi cient to avert grave impacts in places 
like Amazonia.
5  CONCLUSIONS
The Environmental Impact Study (EIA-RIMA) is still only token, but the 
system must be fi xed rather than abandoned. The EIA-RIMA needs to be part 
of  the decision on overall execution of  the project, rather than a last-minute 
hurdle that can only result in adding measures to minimize the impacts when a 
project that is already decided upon is implemented. 
Environmental services can serve as a guide to policy. The economy in 
Amazonia must be reoriented to be based on maintaining forest rather than 
destroying it. Environmental services include biodiversity maintenance, water 
cycling and carbon storage, but currently it is carbon that is best positioned to 
affect monetary fl ows on a scale and with a rapidity that could change the course 
of  events in Amazonia. Brazil has a key role to play in international negotiations 
on this issue because this country has the least-expensive mitigation option 
(avoided deforestation) and because Brazil is one of  the countries with the most 
to lose from continued global warming, including a substantial risk of  losing the 
Amazon forest to the impacts of  drought and fi re.
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